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Abstract 
This paper discusses the conceptualisation of group deprivation - particularly 
of Dalits and Adivasis - in recent poverty analyses in India. While the poverty 
debate highlights the severe inequalities that groups based on social identity are 
exposed to, it pays insufficient attention to the nature of exclusion these 
groups suffer from, and the causes of historically rooted deprivation. This 
paper explores the ways in which ‘SC/ST’ (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes) categories are applied in analysis and policy, the role of these 
categorisation in India’s targeted poverty programmes and recent BPL (Below 
Poverty Line) Census, how these understate different manifestations of 
discrimination, and the risks that targeted programmes enhance stigma of 
groups. 
Keywords 
Group inequalities, poverty, social exclusion, Dalits, Adivasis, targeting, stigma 
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RESCUING EXCLUSION FROM THE POVERTY DEBATE: 
Group Disparities and Social Transformation in India 1 
1 Introduction  
There has been, once again, a surge of interest in poverty analysis in India, and 
group disparities play an important role in this. This is not just of academic 
interest, but directly related to financial allocations for central government 
public programmes to states, while the debate on poverty estimates is also 
linked to the discussion on identifying the poor at local level. This article 
discusses the ways in which India’s deprived groups - particularly Dalits and 
Adivasis - feature in these discussions. While the poverty debates highlight the 
severe inequalities that groups based on social identity are exposed to, the 
poverty focus within the debate and policies under the ‘Inclusive Growth’ 
agenda tend to pay insufficient attention to the nature of exclusion these 
groups suffer from. Moreover, against concerns in the international literature 
of the possible stigmatising effects of targeted programmes, the article explores 
the risks of the way in which ‘SC/ST’ (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) 
categories are applied in analysis and policy. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. It first summarises some of 
the main features of the recent poverty discussion in India, and how this 
relates to new proposals for identifying the poor, the BPL (Below Poverty 
Line) Census. The second section describes the evidence from household 
surveys about disparities between social groups, which have changed little over 
time, with most recently particularly Adivasis falling further behind. I then 
move to the frameworks of public policies to address social disparities that 
have been in place in India for over half a decade, with its modifications, and 
the way in which attention to deprived groups has been enhanced in recent 
programmes like Sarva Shikhsa Abhiyan (SSA) and the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). Section four discusses the principles 
of targeting of the poor, and how this relates to universalisation, as discussed 
in the international literature. Questions posed here include whether 
universalisation facilitates specific attention to specific deprived groups, 
regarding the pros and cons of using social groups or social identity as a 
category of targeting, and the political and administrative dynamics of this in 
the Indian context. The conclusion provides ideas about ways to strengthen 
                                                 
1 This paper was prepared during a ICSSR-NWO-funded research visit to India, to 
develop research collaboration on policies to address group disparities. I thank S.K. 
Thorat and R.P. Mamgain for their hospitality and encouragement to work on this 
paper, and the IIDS staff for the many discussions and insights. I am grateful to 
Manjula Pradeep for showing me the important work of Navsarjan in Gujarat. I also 
thank Zoya Hassan, Harsh Mander, and N.C. Saxena for their time to discuss my 
ideas, and ISS students for their enthusiasm in discussing these important issues. 
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policies vis-à-vis deprived groups, and why in my view exclusion needs to be 
‘rescued’ from the poverty debate. 
2 Recent poverty debates  
After the controversy over the comparability of the 1999-2000 NSS data had 
died down with the availability of the 2004-05 data, new questions emerged 
about the adequacy of the poverty line used, particularly for rural areas. With 
an unchanged poverty line, India’s headcount poverty for rural areas in 2004-
05 became 28 percent, down from 36 per cent in 1993-94, but much higher 
poverty rates particularly in rural Orissa (48 per cent), rural Jharkhand (46 per 
cent), rural Chattisgarh (41 per cent), areas that have large concentrations of 
‘tribal’ populations. A growing number of voices started to assert that the 
national poverty head-count seemed too low, and the poverty line set at too 
meagre standards. Concerns at national level were complemented at state level, 
for example by Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar (2007), who argued that the 
2004-5 levels of rural poverty were too low. The new World Bank poverty 
figures for $1.25 per capita per day on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis 
suggested a national poverty rate of around 42 percent.2 The Arjun Sengupta 
Commission’s estimate emphasised that a very large population of the non-
poor population (according to the official poverty line) is only just above that 
line: application of a Rs.20 per day poverty line brings the number of people 
living in poverty to 800 million, or over 75 per cent of the Indian population. 
The Tendulkar Committee, of which the recommendations were 
accepted by the Planning Commission in April 2010, has brought India’s rural 
poverty line up significantly, bringing it very close to the urban poverty line. 
Taking into account earlier discussions of the adequacy of India’s poverty line,3 
the Tendulkar committee (Planning Commission 2009) updated the 
expenditure basket and revised the poverty line and consequently estimated the 
percentage of poor people in India at 37 per cent, or 435 million, almost 10 
percentage points higher than the earlier estimate. This estimate is of crucial 
relevance, including because it sets the norm for the number of people that are 
entitled to anti-poverty schemes, which are identified using a different exercise, 
as described next. 
Since 1992, the India’s Ministry of Rural Development has carried out 
a Census to identify the people below the poverty line (BPL) in rural areas that 
are eligible for various programmes of various Central Ministries and State 
                                                 
2 This revision – while called $1.25 as compared to $1 – does not imply a higher real 
poverty line; in fact the consumption it represents is slightly lower (Chen and 
Ravallion 2008). The revision as proposed in the Tendulkar (2009) report brings 
India’s poverty line again close to the international poverty line. 
3 Sen (2005), Himanshu (2008), Dreze and Deaton (2008) show that the percentage of 
households with calorie consumption below the norm has been increasing since 1987. 
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Departments.4 As described in the Saxena Report (2009), which focused on the 
need to formulate a new BPL methodology, there is now much experience 
with this process, which presents critical lessons regarding the possibility of 
effectively targeting benefits,5 which are becoming increasingly pertinent as the 
Indian National Food Security Act will come into operation.  
At the same time, evidence shows problems with targeting 
methodologies. The procedure for identifying the poor has become more 
complex, as an income cut-off point was replaced with multi-dimensional 
indicators. There is evidence that some lists were completed in offices rather 
than actually being carried out. Field research by Drèze and Khera (2010), 
Rodgers and others (2010) highlight that the current methods to target the 
poor are blunt instruments. While the number of BPL beneficiaries at state 
level should remain below the NSS data, in practice it exceeded it, while some 
of the poor that remained excluded were told that the quota had been reached. 
NSS data for 2004-05 showed that only 44 per cent of the poorest households 
(lowest quintile) possessed a BPL card, while 17 per cent of the households in 
the top quintile had one; 61 per cent of the poor were excluded, while 25 of 
the non-poor were included.6  
The recommendations of the Saxena committee includes the creation 
of categories through which the few best-off are ‘automatically excluded’, the 
worst-off ‘automatically included’, and a grading off all the households in 
between. For the automatically included, in the view of the Saxena report, 
exclusion is ‘intrinsically linked to caste, gender and social inequity, and 
ownership of assets like land’, facing ‘insurmountable social barriers to food 
and livelihood security’, including: destitute living of alms, ‘Primitive Tribal 
Groups’, Maha Dalits (Most Discriminated Dalit Groups, like Musahars of 
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh), single women and their dependents, disables, minors 
heading households. For the categorisation of the middle group too, social 
group plays an important role, including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes (SC/ST, in much of the official documentation), Most Backwards 
Castes, and Other Backward Castes (OBC) and Muslims, alongside indicators 
of land ownership, education, health, and household headed by elderly people. 
These recent developments have further intensified the efforts to 
target Indian social policies, using economic but also social-cultural categories. 
We will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this below, after an 
overview of India’s persistent group disparities and policy frameworks. 
                                                 
4 The list of these includes IAS, NSAP, SGSY, TSC, PDS, NMBS, health insurance, 
scholarships. The BPL Census method followed experience with IRDP in the 1980s, 
which highlighted significant inclusion and exclusion errors. 
5 Saith (2007) provides a detailed description and critique of the two-step procedure 
applied for the 2002 BPL Census. 
6 Saxena (2009: 20); quoting Himanshu (2008).  
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3 Group disparities in India  
Alongside continued high poverty and large differences in poverty reduction 
across India, and generally independent of the poverty line chosen, disparities 
across groups are among the more striking feature of India’s poverty profile. 
The NSS measure of consumption shows that in 2004-05 (61st NSS round) the 
average consumption of Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes, or ST) was a mere 70 per 
cent of the average, and that of Dalits (Scheduled Castes, SC) less than 80 per 
cent of the average.7 Moreover, between the mid 1990s and mid 2000s, the rate 
of increase in consumption was lower for Adivasis than for the average, while 
Dalits too did not catch up with the population as a whole, as Table 1 
demonstrates.8 Despite a relatively stable Gini coefficient of income or 
consumption, India has been marked by growing regional disparities, and 
partly linked to that, enduring group disparities. 
TABLE 1 
 Consumption disparities social groups in India (mean per capita consumption) 
  ST SC Other All 
1993-94 247 258 353 325 
2004-05 265 298 416 379 
as % of average 70% 79% 110% 100% 
rate of increase 7% 16% 18% 17% 
Source: calculations from NSS data by Amaresh Dubey 
Disparities in consumption and consequently higher poverty rates are only one 
among the many dimensions of deprivation social groups are exposed too 
(Heyer and Jayal 2009). On average, they own less land, and/or their land less 
often is irrigated, have less access to better-paid jobs, and own fewer 
household assets (Desai et al. 2010: 37, 70). The research compiled in Blocked 
by Caste shows discrimination against low caste and Muslim job applicants, 
even in jobs with high qualifications, lower wages for SC and ST employees in 
similar jobs as higher castes, and - despite positive changes vis-à-vis traditional 
caste rules - discrimination in labour, land, inputs and consumer goods markets 
(Thorat and Newman 2010). Social groups tend to suffer, on average, from 
                                                 
7 Desai et al. (2010: 14 and 24), using IHDS 2004-05 data, show that the median 
household income of Adivasis is less than half of that of ‘forward’ castes, and poverty 
rates four times as high. 
8 These figures refer to averages. SC/ST communities also are represented in higher 
income groups, and occupy prominent positions in higher education and political 
institutions, but “many of those at the very top still suffer from untouchability, being 
socially ostracized, slighted, and continuously reminded of their status, even when 
they are well-placed from an economic point of view” (Heyer and Jayal 2009: 5). 
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worse health and education indicators, with for example Adivasis female 
literacy rates 30 percentage point behind that of high caste Hindu women, and 
vaccination rates being somewhat lower.9 Targeted government programmes 
do reach out to poorest groups, but tend to be weakly implement and 
insufficiently progressive, particularly in many of the poorer states. Moreover, 
Adivasis tend to be subjected to development-induced displacement, while 
Dalits in particular continue to suffer from practices of untouchability, and 
caste-based violence including against expressions of increased voice and 
upward mobility. It is important that these disparities have continued to exist 
despite an extensive range of measures for deprived social groups, as described 
next. 
4 Policy frameworks for deprived groups  
Support to deprived groups is enshrined in the Indian Constitution, and is 
delivered through elaborate administrative and financial mechanisms. The 
origins of affirmative action or reservation policies are to be found in late-
colonial organized movements, notably in the advocacy of Dr Ambedkar and 
Jotiba Phule. India’s approach to historically marginalized groups draws on 
provisions made in the Indian Constitution, which contains explicit state 
obligation towards protecting and promoting social, economic, political and 
cultural rights.10 The Constitution officially abolished untouchability, and the 
disadvantages arising out of its enforcement. It mandates positive 
discrimination in government services, state run and sponsored educational 
institutions and legislative bodies. Amendments to the Constitution have 
promoted representation in local governance structures.  
In defining who to include in the Schedules, the government used the 
1931 Census information at the level of jati, and a list created in 1936: for SCs 
this focused on backward communities in terms of untouchability or 
‘polluting’ status, mixed with economic, educational and local political criteria; 
and for STs spatial and cultural isolation. The National Commissions for SC 
and ST are responsible for considering castes for inclusion or exclusion from 
                                                 
9 Desai et al. (2010: 88, 133-34); not all health indicators in this survey show 
substantially different indicators, but other sources tend to confirm disparities. 
Acharya (2010) and Nambissan (2010) describe social discrimination against Dalit 
children in schools and health care. Recent research on religious minorities, who 
unlike Dalits and Adivasis do not qualify for most special government programmes, 
shows that Muslims are also – and increasingly – suffering from disparities in 
indicators like child under-nutrition and education, and from a segmented labour 
market (Sachar Committee 2006: 43, 52, 95). 
10 The Directive Principles of State Policy commits the state to ‘promote with special 
care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and, 
in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and … protect them 
from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.’ 
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the Schedule, which needs to be ratified in Parliament. Group classifications 
have continued to go through various rounds of reformulation, of scheduling 
and de-scheduling. In the mid 1960s a committee recommended the de-
scheduling of various communities, but this was resisted. The most significant 
and long-lasting impact came from the 1980 Mandal Commission Report, 
which introduced into the administrative and political arena the category 
‘Other Backward Classes’ (OBC), of which the political consequences have 
been widely documented.11 Both the process of scheduling and the principle of 
reservation have been heavily debated, including because of the idea that the 
numerically limited policies of affirmative action create a ‘creamy layer’ among 
deprived communities, and that the practices reinforce identities; we return to 
those issues below. 
Policies to address deprivation for Dalit and Adivasi groups exist in a 
range of areas.12 The first includes legal safeguards against discrimination. This 
includes enactment of the ‘Anti-Untouchability Act’ of 1955, which was 
renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act in 1979, and the Scheduled 
Caste/Tribe Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989. Under the first Act practices 
of untouchability and discrimination in public places and services is treated as 
an offence, while the second provides legal protection against violence and 
atrocities by high castes. These policy measures are monitored annually, with 
consistent high levels of violence. The second policy area focuses on the 
economic interest and empowerment of deprived groups, through education 
and anti-poverty programs. States can make special provision for the 
advancement of deprived groups, through reserved seats for SCs and STs 
students, supported by number of financial schemes, scholarships, special 
hostels, concessions in fees, grants for books, remedial coaching etc. A range 
of income generation programs for poverty reduction exist, and apex financial 
organizations to develop entrepreneurial skills and provide credits for deprived 
groups.  
Recent centrally-sponsored schemes - and as discussed earlier the BPL 
methodology - have intensified attention to benefits for deprived social groups. 
Sarva Shikhsa Abhiyan (SSA) focuses on ensuring that primary education 
reaches the children of poor families, with community-planning and -
management key features of the realisation of these objectives. Inclusion of 
SC/ST children plays an important role, through its focus on access to 
schooling in remote rural communities, primers in local languages, and 
                                                 
11 See Jodhka (2010) for an insightful discussion of the notion of caste and its 
‘moments’ of culture, politics and identity. 
12 This clearly articulated policy framework has been the outcome of different 
interpretations of the nature of, and policies to address, deprivation of marginalized 
groups. In her recent work, Zoya Hassan (2009) argues that caste divisions have been 
central to India’s definitions of disadvantage, and that the idea of cumulative historical 
disadvantage rather than socio-economic disparities have remained central. 
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sensitizing of teachers for example. The National Rural Health Mission 
similarly aims to ensure access to health services in India’s poorest areas, and 
also has a strong emphasis on community-based management, and promoting 
education and empowerment of - and representation in local committees by - 
Adivasi and Dalit women. The UPA government’s flagship National Rural 
Employment Guarantee implies a legal entitlement for every poor rural family 
to 100 days of work at the minimum wage, and aims to end food insecurity, 
empower village communities, and create assets in rural areas.13 As the scheme 
is ‘self-targeted’ - only people who are willing and able to work will enter - 
there is little specific attention for group identities, though there is a 
commitment to creating assets on the lands of Dalits and Adivasis.  
The final, and most controversial area consists of reservation, 
operating in government services, admission in public educational institutions, 
and seats in central, state and local legislature and bodies.14 Over time the 
scope of reservations has been expanded to include government housing, 
government spaces for shops and commercial activities, etc. Reservation 
quotas are formulated on the basis of shares of total population. Judiciary and 
defence are excluded from reservation. The reservation is accompanied by 
special provisions to enhance the ability of these groups to compete for 
government jobs, including relaxation of minimum age and of standards of 
suitability, relaxation in fees, provisions for pre-examination training, separate 
interviews, and provision of experts from SC/ST backgrounds on selection 
committees.15 Thus, reservation in public institutions has come to dominate 
the debate on group deprivation in India (Heyer and Jayal 2009). 
Successive Five Year Plans show gradual public policy changes. 
Initially, the focus was on the enforcement of legislation to prevent atrocities, 
and on focused and additive programs to the general development schemes, 
assuming these would be tailored at the field level to suit the needs of these 
groups. During the 5th Plan Period a new mechanism for fund allocation from 
the general budget was introduced. The Special Component Plan (SCP) 
provides financial allocation from the general sectors in state and central plans, 
                                                 
13 There is a rapidly growing literature on NREGA, for example through the report by 
the Comptroller and Auditor General, large-scale evaluation (Dutta et al. 2010), Khera 
and Nayak (2009) focusing on the impact on women, the role of social audits (Gopal 
2009) and grassroot organizations (Khera 2008).  
14 The Constitution provides for reservation of seats for SCs and STs in the central 
and state legislatures, and in local bodies at district, taluk and village level. The 
constitutional provision of reservation is complemented by statutory provisions to 
enhanced political participation. Unlike the reservation in government service, there is 
a time limit for political reservation, extended every ten years. 
15 Affirmative action is confined to government and government-aided sectors of 
services and educational institutions. Private enterprises and educational institutions 
have been excluded from the purview of the policy. Under the coalition government 
formed in 2004 a debate about reservation in the public sector was initiated. 
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equivalent to the percentage of deprived groups to the population. During the 
1990s, a ‘rights and empowerment’ discourse found currency, and the Plan 
committed itself to a three pronged strategy of social empowerment, economic 
empowerment and social justice. Successive government plans have envisaged 
a key role for civil society in the implementation of government programs, and 
in the consultation leading up to those plans. An important section of civil 
society has become part of the apparatus that implements targeted programs in 
rural and education sectors, and some of these efforts are likely to have 
reinforced the targeted approaches.  
Monitoring of these programs is carried out by a number of official 
bodies. At the Government of India level the Ministry of Social Justice and 
Empowerment for Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Castes (OBCs) and 
Minorities, is responsible for monitoring - with corresponding departments at 
state level. In the 1990s National Commissions were set up to facilitate SCs, 
STs, OBCs, Minorities and the Safai Karamcharis (Scavengers) in claiming 
their rights - again with corresponding state commissions. 
Relatively little academic or independent analysis exists regarding the 
impact of various policies - certainly compared to the rich body of literature in 
the US or UK. Analyses show strongly contrasting pictures, maybe particularly 
around reservation where the ‘vulgar vote bank politics’ in which these policies 
are embedded is contrasted with positive assessment of perhaps slow and 
intangible but very important symbolic changes brought by these public 
policies. Regular official monitoring reports and reviews have a strong focus 
on inputs, without for example assessing impact on poverty or human 
development indicators, let alone broader objectives around social 
transformation.16  
In certain respects, the support to deprived groups has led to the 
opposite of what some of the progressive legislators more than half a decade 
ago intended, and made social identities ever more deeply entrenched in policy 
and political frameworks. We now turn to a discussion of the possible 
implications of the use of group categories in the targeting of benefits of 
public policies, starting with a brief discussion of the international literature on 
targeting. 
                                                 
16 The evidence on Orissa points to poor performance even at the level of utilization 
of funds – with the special programme for southern Orissa a prime example (de Haan 
2008) One cannot generalize for this, but it does suggest that the programmes, per se 
are unlikely to make a big impact on deeply-entrenched social differences. What they 
have done, however, is contribute to reinforce the categories as such, of the labelling 
of blocks as ‘tribal’ (almost half of Orissa’s block have majority tribal population), and 
common language that identifies poverty with tribal identity (discussed further below). 
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5 Targeting the poor: pros and cons 
 
Who are the people entitled to the yellow or red coupons? ... What is 
the unit of entitlement  ...?  ... do the people in the village clearly 
understand it? ... why is there such a clamour for coupons for every 
member of the family? The above questions typically highlight what 
have come to be known as the inclusion and exclusion errors in the 
identification of the poor in India. These errors and the debate around 
the numbers of the poor have come to dominate the question of policy 
prescriptions like they never did in the past ever (Tripurari Sharan, 
Secretary, Department of Food and Civil Supplies, at Patna seminar on 
Poverty in Bihar, April 2010). 
 
Targeting the poor has become an increasingly important feature of 
India’s public policies, particularly of centrally-sponsored schemes like the 
Public Distribution Scheme (PDS) and more recently SSA, NRHM and 
NREGA as discussed above. The latter follows the self-targeting method of 
employment schemes, where only the most needy would be willing to supply 
labour for wages (though wage rates in NREGA are relatively high compared 
to market rates). For PDS, identification of the poor through administrative 
means is crucial, and will become even more important when the National 
Food Security Act comes into operation. Knowledge about ‘inclusion and 
exclusion errors’ is growing, and it is thus important to review what we know 
about the practices of targeting, first in general before we discuss practices of 
targeting towards social groups. 
Since the 1980s, targeting has come to play a central role in the social 
policies of low-income countries (and in the OECD), and this move has been 
associated with the rise of neo-liberal approaches to economic and other 
public policies. While targeting is central to recent social protection programs 
around the world,17 with a large literature on targeting errors and success, the 
social policy literature including that generated by UNRISD has been 
extremely critical of principles of targeting. Mkandawire (2005) argues that 
policy advice has not learnt from the historical experience with targeting, and 
that more equal societies have tended to lean towards universalism. Four issues 
in the debate on targeting are important for the discussions here. 
First, there is the cost dilemma. On the one hand, targeting is seen, and 
became increasingly popular during the 1970s and 1980s, as a mechanism to 
reduce expenditure. On the other hand, it is generally recognized that the cost 
of targeting can be high: ‘leakage’ is common, and the administration of 
                                                 
17 See for example Barrientos and Hulme, eds. (2008), Fiszbein and Schady (2009). 
 14
targeting expensive;18 India’s PDS is a case in point, with very large differences 
in performance across states.19 The administrative apparatus necessary may not 
be available in poorest countries or regions, and even if it does exist technical 
problems including aggregation of indicators continue to exist (including how 
to aggregate social identity and economic status). Implementation is likely to be 
subject to local power relations, and violence around the distribution of BPL 
cards has been noted in parts of India. Costs and leakage tend to vary greatly 
according to types of targeting: targeting based on income criteria is likely to 
be very difficult, while self-targeting as in employment schemes, or targeting 
on the basis of group characteristics (e.g. pregnant women, school-age 
children) is typically less expensive and less likely to lead to leakage. 
A second question is whether targeting of benefits leads to reduced 
political support. There is a common assertion - though not to my knowledge 
sufficiently tested - that programs for the poor tend to be poor programs.20 
Also, universal programs would engender political support from the middle 
classes, unlike targeted programs, which imply the better-off have to pay for a 
program from which they derive no benefits. However, it is possible for 
targeted programs to be supported by a progressive middle class, and it may be 
equally true that support for benefits depends on the assurance that they do 
reach the ‘deserving poor’ (particularly if the delivery comes with conditions, 
such as sending children to school). India's Integrated Child Development 
Programme and many other targeted primary health, nutrition and school 
programs to my knowledge have seldom been openly opposed by the powerful 
or better-off.21 Recent experience with targeted programmes, particularly in 
Brazil, also shows that it is possible - under specific circumstances - for 
political leaders to generate political commitment for targeted schemes. 
Third, Tendler (2004) in particular has argued that targeting tends to 
contribute to a ‘parcelization’ and ‘projectization’ of social policy. Targeting is 
a convenient method for externally-funded projects, with limited time 
duration, and requirements to show time-bound result. This also implies a bias 
towards particular forms of partnerships, with agencies dedicated to such 
targeted programmes, in practices often operating outside mainstream line 
agencies (like social funds that became a popular donor instrument to channel 
benefits to the poor, starting in the wake of the crises and adjustment 
                                                 
18 Ravallion (2009) argues that cost calculations are less clear than suggested, and more 
attention should be paid to outcomes for poor people. 
19 The Planning Commission concluded that 58 per cent of subsidized food grains did 
not reach the BPL families, and the cost of transferring Rs.1 is Rs.3.65; people in 
Kerala received on average 4.58 kg of food grains, while in Bihar its was only 0.15 kg 
(Saxena 2010). 
20 For example Mkandawire (2005), quoting Amartya Sen.  
21 It is important to retain a notion of political agency in the analysis of social policy, 
and the historical lessons that much social policy is driven by the (enlightened) self-
interest of elites or middle classes as well as class mobilisation. 
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programmes of the 1980s). Similar issues pertain to India’s Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes, and the tendency of adding special and often overlapping 
programmes. Arguably, this is not unique to targeted programs, but ingrained 
in the federal nature of its policy making and implementation; however many 
of the Schemes do tend to have a targeted approach, hence to review the 
impacts of this is particularly important for these major schemes.  
The increasing emphasis in India on rights in the implementation of 
public policies does have the potential to change the mode of implementation, 
as roots of enhanced accountability are clearly planted.22 However, the 
proliferation of schemes at central and state levels continues. Moreover, the 
recent debates (and the Inclusive Growth model which emphasises the sharing 
of benefits of growth23) have a strong focus on targeted poverty programmes: 
not only does this make the question of impact of targeting more pertinent, 
but it also tends to reinforce a ‘residual’ notion of social policy, which focuses 
attention merely on the malfunctions of markets rather than transformation of 
institution.24 This approach focuses on addressing specific needs, without 
considering their causes and patterns of social and economic exclusion. 
NREGA for example has been shown to be a successful cash transfer scheme, 
providing important relief to insecurity of poor workers, but the emphasis is 
strongly on the number of days worked, and much less on the contribution to 
rural infrastructure and agricultural improvement (or, indeed, land reform),25 
which would be central for sustained development and transformation of 
socio-economic relations.  
A further argument revolves around the social and psychological 
impact of targeting on its beneficiaries. Because benefits are targeted, they 
provide little incentive for beneficiaries to ‘graduate’ out of the program (as 
they would loose the benefit), a problem that universal benefits would avoid. 
Targeted benefits can stigmatize groups of beneficiaries, as they single out a 
group of people as ‘poor’ and as ‘beneficiaries’ rather than ‘participants’, may 
lower their self-esteem, and might divide them according to specific programs. 
                                                 
22 http://www.righttofoodindia.org/index.html 
23 In the Foreword to the 11th Five Year Plan the Prime Minister stresses that inclusive 
growth implies that benefits must be “adequately shared by the poor and weaker 
sections of our society, especially the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and the Scheduled 
Tribes (STs), Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and minorities” (in: Mehta and Bhide, 
undated); the Plan emphasizes growth and human development, but the poverty 
debate has focused mostly on targeted programmes. See Dev (2008) for a discussion 
of inclusive growth policies. 
24 Since 2004, public policy has focused on social sector and social protection 
schemes, with apparently much less attention to productive sectors of agriculture, 
non-farm occupations, and other sectors, even thought there is evidence that 
agriculture production, jobs, and rural-to-urban migration have grow only very slowly.   
25 nrega.nic.in/.../Monitoring_&_MIS_Presentation.pps; 
nrega.nic.in/presentations/Checklist_st_monnrega.doc.  
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Again, these issues are context-specific, and to some extent a question of 
design. Targeted benefits can be a ‘right’, as in India, thus achieving inclusion 
in terms of access to state provisions. Targeted schemes can encourage 
participation, and can lead to political mobilization. The incentive issue too can 
be incorporated into program design: for example if wages are provided below 
market level, and schemes only operate during times when no employment is 
available, it is unlikely that beneficiaries would become dependent on the 
scheme.  
Thus, there are many unresolved questions regarding the need and 
possibilities of targeting the poor. Universalism does not preclude targeting, 
and indeed the classic social policy literature highlights the potential 
progressive role of ‘targeting within universalism’.26 We now turn to the 
question of targeting using group and social identity. 
6 Social groups as targeting category  
 
during the process of enumeration of various castes under the census 
operations in pre-Independence India, there was a clamour from 
several communities for being enumerated as members of higher caste 
as against their existing status   ... people seeking higher social status in 
the country. The contrast with the situation today cannot be missed. 
By attempting to get itself enumerated in the ranks of the poor a family 
is obviously not doing anything that may even be remotely associated 
with attempts to improve its social status... There is, in a sense, a 
premium on poverty. The stigmatic connotations of poverty in social 
terms seems to have waned for all practical purposes. (Tripurari 
Sharan, op. cit.) 
 
Sharan may have over-stated the extent to which the stigma of lower 
castes may have disappeared, but his point about the impact of the way in 
which government programmes are implemented is an important one. The use 
of social group and identities is very different from the use of targeting 
categories and practices in social protection programmes elsewhere, such as 
pregnant mothers, or associated with changes in behaviour such as school or 
health care attendance. The Indian practice of adding social group (and 
                                                 
26 Skockpol, quoted in Echeverri-Gent (1993: 197 ff), implying specific programmes 
through which universalistic policy is implemented in for example education, health, 
and employment. See P. Sainath’s note on universalisation in the Saxena (2009) report 
on BPL. 
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historical disadvantage) as category of targeting has a number of implications, 
which require further reflection. 
As indicated above, the international literature is concerned about the 
stigmatisation that targeted benefits create, as they single out a group of 
people, which may lead to lowering of their self-esteem, and resentment 
amongst those that do not receive the benefits. Galanter (1984: 551) discussed 
this with respect to affirmative action in India, but the literature - alongside 
political differences - remains divided over the question. Guru (2001) sees the 
application of categories as a deliberate and artificial construction of the state, 
trapping deprived groups into passivity and subordination. Simultaneously, 
there is clear evidence of resentment against affirmative action in India, as 
elsewhere, but there is also evidence and recognition of the positive benefits, 
as many people in senior positions are unlikely to have got there in the absence 
of affirmative action, and they do provide role models for others (the absence 
of affirmative action for Muslims is arguably one of the causes for the relative 
lack of progress in education indicators).  
While the impact on own and others’ perceptions, and whether it was 
stigma or affirmative action that came first remain a matter of dispute, the use 
of social group in public policies does seem to have reinforced group identities. 
It may be important to stress that these social identities are not primordial, but 
created and reinforced through social and policy practices, and as such are 
heavily disputed. Classifications of communities, and creation and dismantling 
of caste categories have been criticized. Inconsistencies in comparisons across 
states, sometimes even regarding classification as ‘caste’ or ‘tribe’, are almost 
inevitable. Critics of reservation have argued that they are based on too broad 
categories indicating collective deprivation of communities, and that some 
communities - notably Muslims, and OBCs earlier - are wrongly excluded from 
affirmative action. The application of preferential policies has seen a 
continuous expansion of entitlements, thus weakening a focus on the most 
marginalized groups, and arguably diluting the focus on the causes of their 
marginalization. 
In the Indian case, political dynamics - notably those of ‘vote banks’ - 
have given a tremendous impetus to the expansion of preferential policies, to 
different spheres and for a growing number of groups. Since the decline of the 
hegemonic power of the Congress Party, caste politics, or the ‘democratic 
incarnation of caste’ (Shah 2002: 28) has become a central feature of Indian 
politics and public debate even while caste-related phenomena like rituals and 
association with occupation are changing (Beteille 2007). Even the Hindutva 
movement of the 1990s did not stop the ascendancy of caste as organizing 
political framework. This has taken the practices of preferential policies far 
beyond their original motivation and continued to extend the life of the 
affirmative policies that were designed to be in existence for a period of ten 
years only. 
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We know very little about the stigmatizing effect of special provisions 
for social groups, and clearly more research is needed. Affirmative action has 
contributed to political opposition and even polarization, while they have also 
contributed to an enhanced articulation particularly of a Dalit identity. Where 
the stigma of Dalits and others continue to exist, special provisions may 
become part of discriminatory attitudes. Research by Nambissan (2009: 23) 
which highlighted both severe social discrimination in schools and increased 
assertion by lower caste children, also showed how special programs 
contribute to stigmatisation, with higher caste boys teasing “you are of low 
caste, you get scholarship, we do not.” What this suggests is not that 
affirmative policies are undesirable - clearly the stigma of case precedes that of 
that possibly brought about by affirmative action - but that policies need to be 
sensitive to the nature of exclusion, and ensure safeguards against informal 
mechanisms of discrimination are an integral part of policy implementation. 
While the categories of social groups also have become firmly rooted 
in the discourse and practices of government policy implementation (de Haan 
2007), there is remarkable little research on the day-to-day practices of 
government officials in their application. One should expect a great deal of 
diversity in practices across the country, but the challenges in India’s poorer 
areas are an important reminder of the different impacts of policies. Orissa has 
had relatively poor implementation of many of the public programs, including 
the KBK program, and de Haan (2008) argued that weak accountability - weak 
local governance, civil society - and unchallenged dominance of a coastal based 
elite have been contributing factors to the weak implementation of poverty 
and other programs. Moreover, in my own experience with government 
officials, the application of administrative categories does not seem to alter 
deeply-entrenched social differences and attitudes, and arguably contribute to 
reinforcing of the categories, of labelling of blocks (territorial divisions) as 
‘tribal’ (almost half of Orissa’s block have majority tribal population), and 
common language that identifies poverty with tribal identity. Critically, in 
Orissa, Dalit and Adivasi identity have been very weakly articulated in Orissa, 
with political representatives having had very little progressive impact, and the 
policy and political dynamics are radically different in other parts of the 
country. 
The Orissa experience, while not generaliseable to India, provides an 
indication of the conditions under which application of social group categories 
can contribute to social transformation. Arguably the frameworks of 
development in Orissa are insensitive to the nature of exclusion that exists in 
the state. To be more precise, the predominant power relations do not 
facilitate an implementation of these policies that will lead to a transformation 
of social relations (whereas in Bihar which has been marked by social churning 
these same policies become central to the ‘caste politics’). Instead, though 
more research is needed to test this hypothesis, the way targeted programs are 
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implemented in these circumstances is likely to lead to continued 
stigmatization of marginalized groups.  
7 Conclusion 
For over half a century, categories of ‘SC’ and ‘ST’, and indeed ‘SC/ST’ have 
become firmly imprinted on the administrative apparatus and in the mindset of 
officials. The current Inclusive Growth emphasis on ensuring the poorest do 
benefit from India’s high levels of growth, and the recent debates on inclusion 
and exclusion errors in social protection programmes particularly related to the 
food distribution system is deepening this imprint. Current methods to target 
the poor tend to be blunt instruments, and various studies show relatively poor 
performance of targeted schemes like PDS, with large variations across states.  
The main concern here is a different or complementary one. The key question 
is not whether benefits reach the poor (or whether ‘inclusion errors’ are 
reduced), but what the method of trying to reach the poor does to the nature 
of social exclusion that deprived social groups in India is exposed to.27 The 
reasons why, in a conceptual sense, ‘exclusion’ needs to be rescued from the 
poverty debate are the following. 
India’s steady trend of poverty reduction and relatively stable Gini 
coefficient should not make us loose sight of the deeply entrenched social, 
economic and political inequalities, notably between different social groups. 
Neither the estimation/measurement (NSS) nor the identification (BPL 
Census) of the poor analyse the causes of poverty, or the nature of exclusion. 
This is partly corrected with an analysis of correlates of poverty (for example, 
Dalits’ deprivation is linked to landlessness) but this merely shifts the problem, 
as the causes of these correlates still remain unclear. This is not mere 
semantics, as the causes of landlessness of Dalits, of lack of access to forest 
produce for Adivasis, of different returns to labour, etc. are key to 
understanding the nature of exclusion. With the focus on targeted poverty 
programmes, the nature and causes of deprivation receive little attention. 
The categories of ‘SC/ST’ have been predominantly administrative 
ones, and possibly over time increasingly applied unthinkingly. The way the 
categories are clubbed together (and the dominance of ‘caste’ as explanation of 
all differences and disparities) suggests a risk that policies are applied 
insensitive to specific context: no only is the nature of discrimination against 
Dalits fundamentally different from that against Adivasis, but each group is 
highly heterogeneous. The affirmative policies that were initially scheduled to 
exist for ten years have continued to be extended, without fundamental 
consideration of objectives and achievements. The initial focus on most 
                                                 
27 See Thorat and Sabharwal (2010) for a conceptual discussion of the notion of social 
exclusion; my own interpretation of the notion is described in de Haan (1998). 
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deprived groups has arguably been weakened by the continuous extension of 
groups of beneficiaries: the argument here of course is not that these would 
not be deserving of support, but that the extension of policies - alongside the 
‘targeting of benefits - leads to losing sight of the nature of deprivation and 
discrimination different groups suffer from. 
There has of course been a very different process of assertion of group 
identity notably that of Dalits, most recently with the rise of an urban middle 
class, indeed partly as the result of affirmative action. For policy purposes, it is 
critical that understand the conditions under which such progressive 
identification does occur, what institutions and attitudes hinder this, and in 
particular in the context of the debate on poverty estimation and identification 
what additional measures need to be put in place to ensure targeting to social 
groups will have the intended transformational impacts. 
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